Introduction
Although economists have traditionally paid only minor attention to non-profit organizations, a lot of research has been done on the economics of universities since Veblen's pioneering work "The Higher Learning in America" (Veblen, Th. 1933) . Most of this research, however, is dominated either by attempts to measure returns on investment in higher education 1 or by empirical studies of the effects of different aid and funding policies on the behaviour of universities and students.
2 Compared to this, only little work has been done on the institutional behaviour of universities and its determinants within the market context (for an overview see, e. g., Raines, P. u. Leathers, C. 2003) . Moreover, even within this subgroup of literature, most of the work is rather descriptive and lacks formal strength. There are surprisingly little attempts to analyse the behaviour of universities rigorously within a neoclassical equilibrium framework that explicitly accounts for the maximization behaviour by the individuals involved. The pioneering work within this field of literature is the contribution by Garvin (1980) who developed the first elaborate model of a university as a utility maximizing institution. More recent contributions in this tradition are, e. g., Borooah (1994) , Trannoy (1998a, 1998b) and Del Rey (2000) . However, these contributions concentrate almost entirely on the supply side and pay only little attention to the demand side, i. e., to the question, how demand for enrolments is determined. In so far, the literature available provides only incomplete answers to important policy issues like, e. g., the reaction of potential students and the accompanying change in enrolments if government decides to substitute governmental grants paid to the university partially by increasing tuition fees.
The present paper tries to shed some light on issues like this using a simple equilibrium model that captures the essential features of the problem by simultaneously accounting for the maximization behaviour at the demand side as well as the supply side. In short, demand for enrolments is traced back to the decision of (potential) students who aim at maximizing expected lifetime income. The key factors underlying this decision process are the students' innate abilities, the degree of educational effort undertaken by the university and the strength of academic standards, as well as several other determinants like e. g., tuition fees and differences in income between graduates and non-graduates. In turn, the behaviour of the university in terms of educational effort, the strength of academic standards and research activities depends on the demand for enrolments, on the amount of financial resources available and on the specific objectives pursued by the university. A detailed description of the model is given in Section 2. In Section 3, the equilibrium conditions are derived and Section 4 provides a throughout comparative statics analysis. Finally, Section 5 closes the paper with a short summary of the main findings and some remarks on promising routes for future research.
Before proceeding, however, one important qualification should be noted. The model presented below follows the tradition of Garvin (1980) and attempts an entirely positive economic analysis. Hence, it does not ask, how a university should behave from the viewpoint of social welfare, but it asks how universities actually behave. Within this context, the main emphasis is on the implications of different funding mechanisms (governmental grants vs. tuition fees) in combination with different objectives pursued by the university (maximizing enrolments vs. maximizing prestige via research output).
The Model

Demand Side
In order to keep the model as simple as possible and to avoid complications associated with competition between different universities, 3 it is assumed that there exists only one (public) university in the geographical area under consideration and potential students located within this area (i. e., individuals who just have accomplished university entrance qualification) are completely immobile. 4 Potential students only have to decide whether to enrol at university or to start working within the non-academic sector. This decision, however, is subject to uncertainty since students once enrolled cannot be sure whether they finally will be graduating or not. In general, it seems sensible to assume that the probability of graduation depends on an individual's innate 3 Neglecting competition is almost standard in economic models of the behaviour of universities as complained by Rothschild, M. and White, L. 1993 (p. 11) . There are only few models which explicitly account for competition between universities: Gary-Bobo, R. and Trannoy, A. 1998b as well as Debande, O. and Demeulemeester, J. 1998 analyse competition between universities within a framework that concentrates on teaching and neglects research activities. Del Rey, E. 2001 presents a model of competition between state universities that teach and research, and Kemnitz, A. 2004 explores the impact of university finance reform on teaching quality competition. 4 As already pointed out by Garvin, D. 1980 (p. 9) , the assumption of immobility of potential students and its implications concerning limited competition between universities seems to be more or less realistic except for universities with a very high reputation for excellence which attract students from a larger geographic market.
ability in terms of coping with the requirements of academic education as well as on the characteristics of education supplied by the university. To capture this decision problem, indicate potential students by j = 1, 2, …, n, and let us assume that the innate ability of individual j is given by , 0 1 j d a 6 @. Moreover, denote the strength of the university's academic standards by , q 0 1 d 6 @ and its educational efforts, measured as the ratio between financial resources devoted to instruction and the number of students enrolled, by e > 0. Now, let us combine these factors in order to build a "success function" which describes the probability that individual j will become graduated if she chooses to enrol at university:
Hence, individual j's probability of graduation if she chooses to study is the higher, the higher is her own ability j a . Moreover, the function w(e,q) is assumed to be continuous, twice differentiable and to satisfy the following properties for any level of e > 0 and , : , , respectively. Since w(e,q) is the most important driving force within the present model, the above assumptions should be recognized carefully. Due to w 0 > e l and w 0 < q l the probability of graduation is the higher, the higher are the university's educational efforts e and the lower are academic standards q. The second derivative w 0 < ee m indicates decreasing marginal "productivity" of educational efforts. The second derivative w 0 <m indicates an increasing marginal reduction in the probability of graduation if academic standards are tightened. Moreover, if educational efforts approaches zero the probability of graduation also tends to zero irrespective of academic standards. Similarly, for any level of educational efforts the probability of graduation tends to zero if academic standards approaches an upper bound which is set at q = 1.
5 Finally, the assumed sign of the cross derivative w qe m indicates that the reduction in the probability of graduation caused by a marginal strengthening of academic standards is decreasing or at least constant if educational efforts are increased.
Next, let us assume that the discounted lifetime income of an individual who decides not to study at all is given by R r . Graduates of the university under consideration receive a discounted lifetime income of zq R a p
with z > 0, 0 < c < 1, p ≥ 0 and a ≥ 0. Here, the term zq 1 + h reflects that higher academic standards lead to a higher future income of graduates, 6 the term 1 c -h corrects 5 Taken together, these two assumptions assure that the model always leads to an interior solution with e > 0 and q < 1. 6 Note that the model does not distinguish whether the differences in income between graduates and non-graduates are due to the accumulation of human capital or just due to a pure signalling effect (on this topic see, e. g., Belfield, C. 2000, Chap. 2) . Assuming for example that the income of a graduate of a university with "average" academic standards q = 0.5 is twice as high as the income of a non-graduate would imply z = 2. Empirical data on the correlation between academic standards of universities and the average starting salary of graduates are provided by Rothschild, M. and White, L. 1993. for the opportunity cost of education in terms of forgone income during studying, 7 the term a represents governmental aid paid directly to students and p represents a tuition fee charged by the university. 
At this stage of reasoning, there is a strong temptation to assert that individual j will choose to enrol at university only if this leads to an expected lifetime income higher than the lifetime income of a worker within the non-academic sector, i. e.,
However, money is not everything and studying for some years probably might be more fun than immediately starting to work. In order to account for these additional "leisure benefits" of studying, the model assumes that individual j will choose to study
with b > 0. 9 As a consequence, individual j will refrain from studying if her ability a j falls short of a certain minimum level a r which can be calculated from
for a j (see also Figure 1 ):
According to (3), on the one hand the minimum ability a r is the lower, the higher are leisure benefits and governmental aid directly paid to students. On the other hand, a r is the higher, the higher are the opportunity cost of studying given by c and the higher are the direct costs given by the tuition fee p are. The latter result reiterates the well known observation that tuition fees are not only a source of funding but also an economic mechanism of selection which can be used to allocate scarce enrolment space to the most talented students (see, e. g., Rothschild, M. u. White, L 1993) . This effect, however, is reduced by governmental aid directly paid to students.
7 Assuming for example that the time spent by a student at university accounts for ten per cent of her total working life would imply c = 0.1. 8 In contrast to the latter assumption, one could argue that some years at universities are better than no higher education at all. To account for this consideration, it would be possible to adjust the income term upward for those who decide to enrol but do not graduate. This modification, however, would complicate the model without providing any interesting additional insights. 9 Of course, in order to ensure an interior solution, it has to be assumed that leisure benefits in terms of monetary equivalents plus governmental aid are smaller than the costs of studying at all, i. e. R p < + + b a c r . Otherwise, studying would be attractive even for the least talented individual with a j = 0.
Fig. 1: Ability and Enrolment
Now, for simplicity let us assume that abilitiy a j is uniformly distributed over the space [0, 1] and the mass of potential students is n.
10 Under this condition, the total number of students attracted by the university, s(e, q), easily can be calculated from , , s e q n e q 1 a = -rĥ h
7
A (see also Figure 1 ):
The implications of this demand function for higher education should be noted carefully. As indicated by (4), the number of students attracted is the higher, the smaller is the tuition fee, 11 the higher are governmental grants paid to students, the smaller are the opportunity costs of forgone income, the higher are leisure benefits b, the higher are the differences in income between graduates and non-graduates (indicated by z) and the higher are the university's educational efforts e. In contrast, the impact of academic standards on the number of students attracted (i. e., the sign of s q l ) is ambiguous due to w 0 < The reason for this ambiguity is straight forward: On the one hand, for given ability a j and given educational efforts e, an increase in q reduces the student's probability of graduation as easily can be seen from w 0 < q l . On the other hand, however, an increase in q also leads to a higher future income of those students who finally become graduated. Taken together, these two opposite effects imply that for given educational efforts, increased enrolments must not necessarily come at the expense of reduced academic standards. Instead, starting with a sufficiently small q, the effect on the future income of graduates will dominate such that a further increase in q will lead to a higher number of students attracted. 12 10 Assuming a normal distribution instead of an uniform distribution would be more realistic, but it would complicate the analysis without changing the main results. 11 For a comprehensive survey of empirical studies on the impact of tuition fees on enrolments see, e.g, Heller, D. 1997. 12 The intuition of this result can be enhanced in the following way: From equation (5) for a low q the average is greater than the marginal and enrolments increase when standards increase.
Before proceeding to the supply side by describing the university's objectives and constraints it should be recognized that the above model also allows us to draw a conclusion about the "quality" of the students attracted in the sense of their average ability. Since only those individuals with ,1 j d a a r 6 @ will decide to study, their average ability , e q a u^h can readily be calculated from , . , e q e q 0 5 1 = a a + u rĥ h 7 A:
Equation (6) reiterates that an increasing number of students attracted always comes at the expense of a lower average ability.
Supply Side
Now, let us turn to the university's decision problem. Let B indicate total financial resources available to the university and let C indicate total costs of education and research. To simplify the analysis, it is assumed that the university has to satisfy the budget constraint B ≥ C, even though in practice some debt financing is usually possible. Within the present model, the university is financed partially by governmental grants and partially by tuition fees, both fixed by the government. 13 Denoting governmental grants per student by g > 0 14 and the tuition fee by p > 0, total financial resources available to the university are given by B = (g + p) · s(e, q). Total costs can be divided in two major categories: Education costs and costs due to research activities.
15 Accounting for education costs per student given by the level of educational efforts, e, and denoting costs due to research activities by r, leads to total costs of C = e · s(e, q) + r. 16 As a consequence, the budget constraint of the university is given by:
, , g p s e q e s e q r $ $ $ + +^ĥ h h .
It should be noted that this budget constraint implies cross-subsidization between tuition and research which is standard in the literature on the economics of university behaviour (see, e. g., James 1990): The university carries out a profitable activity that might yield only little utility per se (i. e., teaching students) in order to finance an other 13 It should be noted that the latter part of this assumption holds only for public universities. In contrast, private universities usually are free to fix tuition fees by themselves. 14 It could be objected that governmental grants spent to universities are usually a fixed amount of money independent from the number of students actually attracted. This view might be suitable in the short-run. In the long-run, however, it seems more sensible to assume that an increasing number of students attracted is accompanied by increasing governmental grants. 15 For an exhaustive discussion of the different costs involved by operating a university see, e. g., Getz, M. and Siegfried, J. 1991 as well as Brinkman, P. 1990. 16 It should be noted that this cost function implies constant returns to scale in education. This simplification seems to be justified since empirical evidence indicates only modest economies of scale. For an overview on several cost studies see Brinkman, P. 1990 and Hoenack, S. 1990. activity that increases utility but does not cover its own costs (i. e., research activities). Of course, the degree of direct utility derived from teaching students depends on the objectives pursued by the university. Determining the objectives of a university is made difficult by its internal organization: A university is no single actor but consists of different subgroups without a simple hierarchy − in particular administration and faculty − which might pursue different and perhaps conflicting goals (see, e. g. James, E. 1990; Tuckman, H. u. Chung, C. 1990) . 17 However, concerning the objectives pursued by a university at the aggregate level, there seems to be a widespread consensus among economists that two − partially interrelated − factors are of major importance: The quantity of students attracted and the degree of prestige obtained within the scientific community (see, e. g., Raines, P. u. Leathers, C. 2003; James, E. 1990; Garvin, D. 1980) .
The quantity of students attracted is important from the viewpoint of faculty and administration because expanded enrolments are likely to be accompanied by an increasing number of faculty positions and a higher budget to secure expanded facilities like, e.g, laboratories and libraries.
18 Moreover, expanded enrolments endow the university with a larger pool of students for the selection of research assistants and it generally enhances the university's survival as an organization.
Prestige is the second major component entering the university's utility function since it increases the faculty members' market values, generally improves their self-respect and makes research grants easier to obtain (e. g., Garvin, D. 1980, S. 23) . Prestige mainly can be traced back to the quality and quantity of research output "produced" by the university.
19 With respect to this, the model assumes that financial resources devoted to research activities can be used as a proxy for the quality and quantity of research output, as measured by, e. g., appropriate indexes of publication productivity. 20 The amount of financial resources available for research can be evaluated easily from the budget constraint:
, , r e q g p e s e q = + -^ĥ h h. Using (4), this can be re-calculated as:
21 17 In some countries like, e. g., Germany, administration tasks are executed by faculty members themselves on the base of a rotation system. This organization often leads to a somewhat amateurish management but it might help to overcome the problem of conflicting goals as mentioned above. 18 With respect to this line of argumentation, the economics of universities is very similar to the economics of bureaucracies (see, e. g., Downs, A. 1967 and Niskanen, W. 1971) . However, as pointed out by Garvin, D. 1980 (p. 38) , just applying the bureaucratic standard approach of budget maximization to the behaviour of a university would imply an oversimplification. 19 Other factors which add to prestige are -for instance -the quantity and quality of Ph.D.
programs (e. g., Raines, P. and Leather, C 2003, p. 194) or diversity in the racial and ethnic makeup of the student body (e. g., Epple, D. et al, 2002) . These issues, however, are beyond the scope of the present model. 20 It should be emphasized that this assumption, which is standard in modelling the behaviour of universities, neglects the possibility of economies of scale in research activities as well as the possibility of economies of scope resulting from the joint production of tuition and research. On this issues see, e. g., Brinkman, P. 1990 (p. 123) and Johnes, G. 2000 (p. 142) . 21 It should be noted that (8) implies that the university's preferences are non-satiated in research expenditure and no value is placed on retained earnings. Within the context of a private university, the latter implication would be fairly unrealistic. For a public university, however, it (8) , , r e q n g p e zqw e q R R p a 1 1 c c b
To sum up, the university under consideration may derive utility from the number of students attracted, s(e, q), as well as from the amount of financial resources available for research, r(e, q). This approach is sufficiently general to describe the behaviour of a large spectrum of different universities that assign different weights to these objectives. As emphasized by Garvin (1980, S. 35) , in practice some types of universities are primarily concerned with maximizing enrolments, whereas other types of universities primarily aim at maximizing prestige. In order to focus on the implications of these different kinds of behaviour, the following analysis assumes that the university under consideration aims solely at maximizing either enrolments or the research budget. Of course, this assumption is somewhat artificial since in reality most universities maximize a combination of these two elements. But looking at the extremes will facilitate a clear-cut analysis of the different objectives' implications.
Equilibrium
First, consider a university that aims solely at maximizing enrolments s(e, q) subject to the budget constraint , , , g p s e q e s e q r e q $ $ $ + +^^ĥ h h h . Under this assumption, due to w 0 > e l the whole budget available will be allocated to educational efforts, i. e., e* = g + p. Hence, the university has only to decide about academic standards q. Maximizing s(e, q) and accounting for e* = g + p leads to the first order condition s 0 q = l (for the second order condition see Appendix I). As can be calculated from (4), s 0 q = l implies , w ew 0
. The interpretation of this condition is straight forward. Marginally increasing q induces two opposite effects: it reduces the students' probability of graduation and it increases the future income of those who finally become graduated. Hence, the first order condition requires the university to choose q* in such a way that these two effects are balanced in order to maximize the number of students attracted. However, one important caveat should be noted. Since s(e, q) > 0 requires , w e q R p a zqR
h , as can be seen from (4), educational efforts and thereby financial resources available per student, g + p, have to exceed a certain lower bound (g + p) min in order to ensure an interior solution where the university is able to attract a positive number of students at all. This lower bound is the higher, the higher are opportunity costs of studying minus leisure benefits and the smaller are the differences in income between graduates and non-graduates. Now, consider a university that solely aims at maximizing prestige via maximizing research output r (e, q) + --= lĥ h reflects that a marginal increase in the money spent on educational efforts per student, de > 0, has two opposite effects on the research budget: On the one hand, r(e, q) decreases by s(e, q)de since more money is needed to instruct those students already enrolled. On the other hand, the number of students enrolled will increase by s de e l which leads to an increase in r(e, q) by g p e s de e + -l h because any new student attracted adds an amount of g p e + -h to the research budget. Hence, in order to maximize r(e, q) for any given level of academic standards, the second condition requires the university to fix educational efforts in such a way as to balance these two effects. Finally, taken together both conditions imply that e and q have to be combined in such a way that the effects of marginally varying both variables on the research budget are equalized.
The above results reiterate that a university can benefit from enlarged enrolments not only directly but also indirectly via an increase in resources available for research. With respect to this, the behaviour of a university that aims at maximizing prestige via research activities is very similar to the behaviour of a university that aims at maximizing enrolments. However, in the latter case we obtain e* = g + p, whereas in the former case a part of the budget available is allocated to research activities, such that e* < g + p. Moreover, as illustrated by Figure 2, maximizing r(e, q) implies a lower level of academic standards q* and a smaller number of students attracted s* compared to maximizing s(e, q).
22 However, as already emphasized above, in order to attract a positive number of students at all, a certain minimum level of educational efforts is needed. Consequently, the university will be able to squeeze out extra money for financing research activities only if total financial resources available per student exceed a lower bound (g + p)
min . From the viewpoint of government, the message of the above results is obvious: For given governmental grants and tuition fees, a university that aims solely at maximizing prestige via research activities provides only a lower quality of education 23 for a smaller number of students compared to a university that solely aims at maximizing enrolments. The overall welfare effects of these different outcomes, however, depend on the weights assigned to education and research in the social welfare function which is beyond the scope of the present analysis. 22 To see this, note that in both cases the first order condition 0 s q = l has to be satisfied. Hence, due to 0 s <l (see eq. (12) in Appendix I) and 0 s > qe l (see eq. (15) in Appendix II), a lower value of e* has always to be accompanied by a lower value of q and vice versa. Moreover, in both cases s(e, q) is maximized for given educational efforts per student. A lower value of e*, however, implies that s(e, q) attains its maximum at a lower absolute level. 23 Here, "educational quality" refers to the chosen mix of educational efforts e and academic standards q. Formally, educational quality can be viewed as a function f(e,q) with
Fig. 2:
The optimal decision in the case of maximizing s(e, q) or r(e, q), respectively
Comparative Statics Analysis
Now, consider a marginal increase in governmental grants g, the effects of which are summarized in the second column of Table 1. 24 If the university under consideration solely aims at maximizing enrolments, we obtain de* / dg = 1, dq* / dg > 0 and ds* / dg > 0. Hence, in this case, increasing governmental grants leads to a higher educational quality and an increasing number of students attracted which, however, comes at the costs of a decreasing average ability. In contrast, if the university under consideration solely aims at maximizing prestige via research output, neither educational quality nor enrolments will change and the complete amount of extra money obtained from government will be absorbed by the research budget. Hence, in this case, there is no possibility to influence the university's behaviour via marginally varying governmental grants.
Tab. 1: Results of Comparative Statics Analysis
dg > 0 dp > 0 −dg = dp > 0 Next, consider a marginal increase in the tuition fee p, the effects of which are summarized in the third column of Table 1 . Let us begin again with a university that solely aims at maximizing enrolments. In this case we obtain again de* / dp = 1 and dq* / dp > 0. Consequently, marginally increasing the tuition fee has the same impact on educational efforts and academic standards as marginally increasing governmental grants. However, one important difference remains. Whereas the latter measure increases educational quality without increasing the students' costs, this is not true for the former one. Hence, whereas marginally increasing governmental grants always leads to an increasing number of students, the respective effect caused by marginally increasing the tuition fee is ambiguous. As shown in Appendix II, we obtain:
(9) * , , ds zRqw e q n R p a w w e q dp 1 The reason for this ambiguity is straightforward: According to (2), increasing the tuition fee by dp > 0 has two opposite effects on the students' expected lifetime income. On the one hand, it directly decreases E(R j ) by dp. On the other hand, due to de* = dp it increases the probability of graduation by w dp e l which leads to an increase in expected lifetime income by zq w Rdp 1 j e c a -l r h . Hence, the total effect is given by dE R z q w R dp 1 1
A . Now, consider the student "at the margin" with ability j a a = r . Inserting a r as given by (3) Comparing (9) and (10) reveals that ds* / dp > 0 requires dE(R j ) / dp > 0 for the student at the margin. Due to e* = p + g and w 0 < e m , whether the condition dE(R j ) / dp > 0 is satisfied or not depends on the initial magnitude of e. Starting with a comparatively low e, educational efforts exhibit a high "marginal productivity" in the sense of increasing the probability of graduation. Hence, in this case the indirect effect of increasing dE (R j ) by zq w Rdp 1 j e c a -l r h will dominate such that dE(R j ) / dp > 0 and therefore ds* / dp > 0. However, in a situation where educational efforts are already comparatively high, the direct effect of decreasing E(R j ) will dominate such that dE(R j ) / dp < 0 and therefore ds* / dp < 0. Consequently, in the case of maximizing enrolments, marginally increasing the tuition fee p will only lead to an increasing enrolments if total financial resources available per student, g + p, initially are comparatively low.
If the tuition fee p is marginally increased and the university under consideration solely aims at maximizing prestige via research output, we obtain again the result that neither educational efforts nor academic standards will change and the complete amount of extra money obtained from students will be absorbed by the research budget. However, in contrast to the case of increasing governmental grants, an increase in tuition fees will lead to decreasing enrolments. Consequently, the overall effect on the research budget is ambiguous (see Appendix II):
(11) * , dr n zRqw e q R a g p e dp 1 2 c c b
Similar to the above case, dr* / dp > 0 requires that the direct effect of increasing the tuition fee dominates the indirect effect of decreasing enrolments. From the viewpoint of government, the most interesting question might be, what happens if governmental grants are partially substituted by tuition fees, i. e. −dg = dp > 0. As indicated by the results summarized in the forth column of Table 1 , irrespective of the objectives pursued by the university, such a substitution would neither change educational efforts nor academic standards, but it would inevitably lead to decreasing enrolments and a decreasing research budget. Of course, as a positive side-effect, the average ability of the remaining population of students would increase. But nevertheless, the above results clearly indicate that partially substituting governmental grants by tuition fees can never be in the interest of the university.
The fifth column of Table 1 indicates the effects of marginally increasing governmental aid directly paid to students. Irrespective of the objectives pursued by the university, there will be no change in educational efforts or academic standards. However, with increasing financial aid studying becomes more attractive and enrolments as well as the research budget will increase. The same effects occur if studying becomes more attractive due to increasing leisure benefits or an increasing difference in income between graduates and non-graduates, as indicated in the sixth column of Table 1 . Finally, the seventh column of Table 1 indicates the opposite effects if studying becomes less attractive to increasing opportunity costs caused by an increase in c or R r .
Concluding Remarks
The present paper has developed a formal model describing the behaviour of a university within an equilibrium framework where demand for enrolments is traced back to the decision of potential students who aim at maximizing expected lifetime income. The key factors of this decision process are the students' innate abilities, the quality of education offered by the university and several external determinants like, e. g., tuition fees and the difference in income between graduates and non-graduates. In turn, the behaviour of the university in terms of educational efforts and the strength of academic standards depends on the demand for enrolments, on the amount of financial resources available from governmental grants or tuition fees and on the specific objectives pursued by the university.
Within this framework, the paper shows that for given financial resources a university that aims at maximizing prestige via research activities always provides only a lower quality of education for a smaller number of students compared to a university that aims at maximizing enrolments. Moreover, the paper reveals that the effects caused by changes in governmental grants or tuition fees, respectively, are quite different depending on the objectives pursued by the university. Yet, there is also one common feature: Irrespective of which utility function is maximized, partially substituting governmental grants by tuition fees would change neither educational efforts nor academic standards, but it would inevitably lead to decreasing enrolments. As a positive side-effect, however, the quality of the remaining population of students in the sense of their average ability would increase.
Of course, the above analysis still suffers from several simplifications. The most important one might be the absence of competition between different universities. In order to incorporate this issue, one could imagine an extended version of the above model with two regions and one university in each of them. In such an extended model, potential students in each region would have to decide between three alternatives: working within the non-academic sector, studying at the "home university" or studying at the university in the other region. The latter alternative would give rise to some kind of "mobility costs" and it has to be expected that the magnitude of these costs would be one of the key factors explaining the degree of competition between universities (see, e. g., Del Rey, E. 2000) .
A second promising line of future research relates to welfare considerations. The model developed so far concentrates on the level of positive economic analysis. Hence, it only tries to describe the actual behaviour of universities, but it does not ask how universities should behave from the viewpoint of maximizing social welfare. In order to account for this shortcoming, one could imagine another extension of the above model where the government aims at fixing governmental grants and tuition fees in such a way as to maximize a social welfare function comprised of, e. g., the number of students which finally become graduated and the quantity of research output produced by the university.
Zusammenfassung
Im vorliegenden Beitrag wird das Verhalten der Entscheidungsträger einer öffentli-chen Hochschule im Rahmen eines neoklassischen Ansatzes analysiert. Die Nachfrage nach Studienplätzen resultiert aus der Maximierung des erwarteten Lebenseinkommens der potentiellen Studenten. Wesentliche Einflussfaktoren hierbei sind die indivi- 
